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The Evolution of Civil Liberty 
and Equality?
T rial by jury of a civil action is a raritv in our Province since the 
Rules of Court were changed in 1938, and it does not appear to me 
that this latest chapter concerning the jury system and this latest 
development in the evolution of civil liberty and equality should be 
w ithout comment.
As an expression of the democratic ideals of liberty and equality, 
trial by jury, rather than by arbitrarily appointed officials, became the 
accepted mode of trying both crim inal and civil actions at a very early 
period in English legal history. At the tim e of the Judicature Acts, 
all common law actions were tried with a jury, and suits in E quity were 
tried bv a Judge alone. After the Acts, the English Court of Appeal 
ruled, that, “wherever there was, before . . . , a right to trial by a jury,
such right still exists.” ( 1 ) -------This right to the trial of an action at
law bv a jury bccame part of the law of this Province upon the inception 
of the laws of England, and it was preserved by the Rules of Court 
under our Judicature Act 1909. (2)
In England this right to a jury trial was, generally speaking, unre­
pealed until 1933; in that year the Administration of Justice Act provided 
that in a civil action the order upon the summons for directions must 
indicate whether the action is to be tried with a jury or w ithout a jury. 
T his enactm ent has been held to have placed the question regarding the
mode of trial w ithin the absolute discretion of the Judges. (3)-------The
New Brunswick rules regarding the mode of trial for civil actions were 
repealed in 1938, and new and different provisions were substituted. (4) 
After providing for a right to a jury trial in actions for libel, slander, 
breach of promise of marriage, crim inal conversation, seduction, m ali­
cious arrest, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, the new rules 
direct that all other actions be tried by a Judge alone, unless the Court 
or a Judge directs a jury trial, because, “the questions in issue are more 
fit for trial by a jury than by a Judge.” These new provisions have never 
been interpreted bv the Court of Appeal; however members of the pro­
fession embrace tHe view that the amended rules repeal any common 
law right to a jury trial.
The lawyers of New Brunswick cheerfully accept the inferiority of 
juries for the trial of all issues, since, presumably as a result of their 
advice to their clients, there are no applications for civil jury trials. W e
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have far outdone the rest of the common law world in the m atter of the 
abolition of civil juries. The right to a jury trial is only slightly abridged 
in any other common law jurisdiction in Canada; on an appeal after a 
jurv trial in another Province, the Supreme Court of Canada may still 
malvc this observation: “A jury is an em inently proper body for the trial 
of a negligence action arising out of an automobile collision.” (5) In 
England it is certain ly still common practice to obtain a direction that 
a jury find the facts in issue between litigants in a civil action. The doc­
kets of C ircuits Courts in New Brunswick are alone uncmcumbered by 
jurv trials. It may be said that in our Province we set an example for the 
rest of the common law world in the m atter of the simplification of the 
adm inistration of justice. (S im plic ity is a mark of perfection! Of course 
it can not be said that the process of sim plification has really culm inated 
vet. W h ile  we arc still burdened by the now outmoded laws of evidence 
(6) and not fully adjusted in every way, the abolition works a severe hard­
ship on our very capable, but very overworked Judges, for Hicir task of 
adjudicating legal disputes approaches the impossible since they have 
been deprived of the assistance of juries.)
The reasons advanced bv the m ajority of the members of our Bar 
as dem onstrating the superiority of non-jurv trials are said to become 
apparent even when one considers the points concerning this superiority 
about which there m ight be debate, and certain ly the superior fitness 
of a Judge alone to try actions which involve issues of law onlv or issues 
of fact involving the integration of complicated data is not debatable.
It has been said that seven heads are better than one for weighing 
issues of simple fact, so that a jury would be the proper body for the trial 
of such issues. Even if it is adm itted that individual jurors, as opposed 
to an entire jury, are equally as reasonable as a Judge and equally as fit to 
try issues or simple fact, especially since their unfam iliarity w ith the 
intricacies of law insures that their deliberations on a question of fact 
arc not distractcd by considerations of points of law, it is said that one 
should realize that each additional member of a body of triers increases 
the chance that the body w ill err; seven persons have seven times the 
capacity for error of one person. It is subm itted that this fact rebuts 
the clever sophism, that seven heads are better than one.
T he additional expense of jurv trials is the factor which must out­
weigh any advantage which society m ight have derived from more 
general participation in the adm inistration of justice by its citizens, so 
as to nullify what m ight otherwise be a sufficient reason for preferring 
trial by jury of cases which m ight properly be delegated to juries. Of 
course the weight of any advantages to be realized from more general 
participation in the adm inistration of justice is only slight, otherwise it 
would not be less than the factor of the small additional expense. T he 
same thing, that it is outweighed by the additional expense, must be 
true of the possible advantage, that the form ality of jurv trials engenders 
an awe which acts as a detcrrant to perjured testimony by witnesses.
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One must regard the abolition of civil juries as an important dev­
elopment in the evolution of civil liberty and equality. Ever since indi­
viduals first banded together, there have been disputes concerning the 
conflicting interests of different persons; the resolution of these disputes 
was alwavs a major concern of socictv. T he abolition of civil juries can 
only be interpreted as evidence of the fact that individuals have learned 
to co-opcratc to such an extent that our society is enabled to concern 
itself less with these conflicts between the interests of its citizcns. There 
was a time when laymen were sufficiently uninformed, that, except for 
the fact that they were an integral part of the Courts and fam iliar w ith 
their necessary role and the noble way in which they discharged their 
duty by reason of sitting 011 juries, thcv m ight not have appreciated this 
role and m ight even have suspected the arbitrarily appointed Judges 
ancl court officials of favoritism and the denial of Hie equality of all men 
before the Courts. I Jovvcvcr today, since the advantages of more general 
participation in the adm inistration of justice arc outweighed by the factor 
of the additional expense involved, the knowledge of the average layman 
has apparently increased to such an extent that, even though lie takes 
110 part in the adm inistration of justicc, he is aware of the role of the 
Courts ancl is confident of their integrity. Consider what a fine com­
plim ent this is to litigants, who arc now w illing to entrust the determ i­
nation of their disputes to apparently casual treatm ent in a practically 
deserted courtroom or a Judge’s chambers!
It is to be hoped that our lawyers, who must be credited with un­
selfishly abolishing civil juries even though it results in the relegation 
of their art to a lower placc in the m anagem ent of our society, w ill now 
apply themselves to the sim plification of our procedural rules and 
especially to the modernization of the rules of the Law of Evidence 
applicable to civil trials, for inasmuch as the rules of evidence are largely 
a product of the jury system they are superfluous to non-jury actions.
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